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CLIPPED WINGS: DOMESTIC DRONE SURVEILLANCE AND
THE LIMITS OF DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
Benjamin White*

“‘[I]n the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be
only of what has been, but of what may be.’ The progress of science in
furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop
with wire tapping.”
– Justice Brandeis, Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928)
(concurring)
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2012, six cows wandered onto the property of a North Dakota
farmer, Rodney Brossart.1 The owner of the cows went to retrieve them.
He told Brossart that the cows belonged to him, but Brossart told him
that they were his cows now. An argument broke out and the police
arrived to the scene. Brossart threatened the police, saying, “If you go
on my land, you won’t walk off.” 2 Brossart and his three sons were
wielding firearms. After a 16-hour standoff, the police called a
neighboring Air Force base, which dispatched a large fixed-wing
unmanned aircraft vehicle (“UAV” or “drone”) called a Predator, which
is armed with cameras and sometimes weapons. Soon Brossart was in
police custody.3
Rodney Brossart and his sons were the first known people arrested
with the aid of a drone. 4 Though his encounter with a drone was
occasioned by his own criminal behavior, important constitutional
questions were at play in the government’s use of drones and their
abilities for aerial surveillance. The public debate hinges on issues of
privacy, liberty, security, and control. Although many states have passed
some legislation concerning drones, 5 the Federal Aviation
Administration’s latest rules governing drones left many privacy
questions unanswered. Congress has yet to pass significant regulations
* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. Thank you to my faithful
supporter, Mandy.
1. Joe Wolverton, II, First Man Arrested By Aid of Drone Convicted in North Dakota, THE
NEW AMERICAN (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/17534-firstman-arrested-by-aid-of-drone-convicted-in-north-dakota.
2. State v. Brossart, 858 N.W.2d 275, 282 (N.D. 2015).
3. Wolverton, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. AMANDA ESSEX, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TAKING OFF: STATE
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS POLICIES 21 (2016).
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on government use of drones, and the courts have seen very few cases
involving drones. The inchoate state of drone law requires a close look
at what sort of judicial protections are likely, in lieu of unified federal
regulation.
Drones “threaten to perfect the art of surveillance.” 6 Unlike covert
government surveillance across networks, such as the work of the
National Security Agency (“NSA”), government “surveillance of the
populace with drones would be visible and highly salient. People would
feel observed,” even if the information gathered was never used. 7
Observation from the sky elevates surveillant activity above the lateral
plane where our images are captured on security cameras and where we
use our computers, lifting the government’s presence into three
dimensions.8
II. BACKGROUND
Congress has dedicated significant energy to debating the issues
attendant to drones and privacy. 9 Drones represent unique issues, not
just in aviation technology, but in privacy, surveillance, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, 10 and Due Process jurisprudence.
Surveillance is a sensitive subject for many groups, including minorities
whose relationships with government figures are frequently already
fraught.11 The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has released
rules governing certain drones; these rules, however, have no
application on government-operated drones, and the public is
increasingly concerned about the risk to their privacy with slow or
inadequate legislative responses. 12
6. M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 30 (2011).
7. Id. at 33 (emphasis original).
8. See Bertrand Guay, Ohio Town Wants to Implement Massive Aerial Surveillance Program,
RT (Apr. 5, 2013, 9:45 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/program-city-surveillance-dayton-412/ (“Drones
aren’t conducting surveillance 24/7 in the United States just yet, but that doesn’t mean there’s nothing to
worry about: in Dayton, Ohio, manned airplanes might soon do the spying.”).
9. See, e.g., The Future of Drones in America: Law Enforcement and Privacy Considerations:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of Sen. Chuck
Grassley, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter Future of Drones].
10. Drones’ impact on the Fourth Amendment has been debated at length. See, e.g., Y. Douglas
Yang, Big Brother’s Grown Wings: The Domestic Proliferation of Drone Surveillance and the Law’s
Response, 23 B.U. P UB. INT. L.J. 343 (2014).
11. See Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move From Above, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (August 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secretsurveillance/.
12. EPIC v. FAA: Challenging the FAA’s Failure to Establish Drone Privacy Rules,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, https://epic.org/privacy/litigation/apa/faa/drones/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2017) (reporting that a privacy group has sued the FAA for failing “to issue and solicit
public comments on proposed drone privacy regulations.”).
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A. The Privacy Risk
1. Dynamics at Play in the Notion and Practice of Surveillance
George Orwell’s 1949 novel, 1984, satirizes the authoritarian state,
where speech and movement are subject to constant surveillance by
anonymous, remote government actors. 13 The expression “Orwellian”
has come to invoke, among other anxieties, governmental actions
designed to infiltrate private life. 14 Edward Snowden’s revelations of the
NSA’s data collection practices confirm Orwell’s suspicion that the
government will appropriate technological advances to monitor society
at the macro and micro levels.15 Julian Assange, of WikiLeaks fame,
describes the “omniscient marvels of today’s surveillance state” as so
advanced to make Orwell’s visions seem “quaint, even reassuring.”16
But not all surveillance is unpopular. After Tamerlan and Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev detonated bombs at the Boston Marathon that killed three
people and wounded 264,17 they were quickly identified through
security footage that helped lead to their capture within five days. 18
Surveillance can lead to other societal benefits as well: closed-circuit
television (“CCTV”) and surveillance cameras have demonstrated the
potential to reduce crime. 19 For instance, Baltimore’s investments in

13. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). In the story, at least two forms of surveillance have become
anchored as cultural norms. In the first chapter, the protagonist notices a low-flying helicopter among
the buildings: it was the police, “snooping into people’s windows.” Id. at 2. Second, and more
predominant, are the ubiquitous telescreens that record audio and visual information with great
sensitivity – at one point, the protagonist notes that “you could not control the beating of your heart, and
the telescreen was quite delicate enough to pick it up.” Id. at 79.
14. See,
e.g.,
Orwellian,
MACMILLAN
DICTIONARY,
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/orwellian (last visited July 9, 2017); Ian
Croch, So Are We Living in 1984?, The New Yorker (June 11, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/so-are-we-living-in-1984; Sam Jordison, Do You Really
Know What ‘Orwellian’ Means?, The Guardian (Nov. 11, 2014, 7:01 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2014/nov/11/reading-group-orwellian-1984.
15. See Ewen MacAskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillancerevelations-decoded#
section/1.
16. Julian Assange, Who Should Own the Internet?, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/julian-assange-on-living-in-a-surveillance-society.html.
17. Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/
us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2017, 5:10 PM).
18. Id.; Kate Dailey, The Rise of CCTV Surveillance in the US, BBC (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/
magazine-22274770.
19. Nancy G. La Vigne, et al., Community Oriented Policing Services, Evaluating the Use of
Public Surveillance Cameras for Crime Control and Prevention vii (2011) [hereinafter Public
Surveillance Cameras].

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 11

360

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

cameras in high-crime urban areas, despite costs in installation,
maintenance, and monitoring, have paid off. Four months after
implementation, total crime within the cameras’ viewsheds had
decreased by almost 25%.20
The introduction of public surveillance systems does not always tout
such impressive numbers, and even the statistics above poorly represent
other dynamics contributing to the change in crime. After similar
surveillant interventions in Washington, D.C., crime was still sporadic.
Statistical analysis did not clearly reveal that the cameras had produced
a positive impact.21 Challenges imperiling the success of surveillance
differ between active and passive monitoring. “Passive” monitoring
finds application in investigations and prosecutions, because no one
watches the images as they are captured. Instead, investigators retrieve
and examine previously recorded footage as the need arises. 22 However,
zooming in after the footage has already been recorded renders granular
images, which do not often lead to positive identifications.23 “Active”
systems are viewed in real time, usually by police or security guards. 24
This occupies their time and keeps them from other duties. Since the
demands of active monitoring exceed the resources of most
jurisdictions, passive and active systems are often used together. 25 These
limitations can be difficult to navigate.
Solutions to the practical limitations described above, however, do
not address the privacy concerns which many find most troubling. A
significant fear is that the people who work with the gathered
information may misuse it. 26 “Mission creep” describes the phenomenon
of “government officials misusing data in bad faith or for ends they
believed were justified, albeit not explicitly authorized.” 27 This concern
20. Id. The underlying theory of why public surveillance can deter crime is consistent with the
rational choice theory, which assumes that individuals weigh the risks and rewards before deciding to
offend. If they know they are being watched, the risk increases for the same reward. In theory, this
dynamic should reduce criminal offenses. The COPS findings indicate that this theory has merit. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 73-85.
22. Id. at 3 and 85,
23. Id. at 85.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 4. Even science fiction writer Isaac Asimov pointed out the flaw in 1984 that Orwell’s
telescreens are far too inefficient to surveil the populace. “One person cannot watch more than one
person in full concentration, and can only do so for a comparatively short time before attention begins to
wander. I should guess, in short, that there may have to be five watchers for every person watched. And
then, of course, the watchers must themselves be watched since no one in the Orwellian world is
suspicion-free.” Isaac Asimov, Review of 1984, http://georgeorwell.org/asi.htm, (last visited FEB. 1,
2017).
26. P UBLIC SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS, supra note 19, at 5. This concern includes an argument
for adequate safeguards and regulations upon the government officials to prevent the misuse of
information.
27. Christopher Slobogin, Surveillance and the Constitution, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1128
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can be further exacerbated when the government hires outside
contractors to perform its intelligence work. Outside contracting entrusts
matters of critical security to private parties, who may be less
accountable to oversight.28
A common rejoinder to privacy advocates is that people with nothing
to hide have nothing to fear.29 One writer has observed that proponents
of this argument’s simplest iteration can be confronted merely by asking
whether they have curtains at home. 30 A stronger form of this argument
maintains that all law-abiding citizens have nothing to hide and “people
engaged in illegal conduct have no legitimate claim to maintaining the
privacy of such activities.”31 Arguably the strongest variant of the
nothing-to-hide argument is that the transaction involves a small amount
of private, but negligible, information about ourselves in exchange for
information that could potentially increase national security. 32 What
becomes clear is that the security concerns and the privacy concerns
need to be balanced.33
The value of privacy, the argument provides, is low, because the
information is often not particularly sensitive. The ones with the
most to worry about are the ones engaged in illegal conduct, and
the value of protecting their privacy is low to nonexistent. On the
government interest side of the balance, security has a very high
value. Having a computer analyze the phone numbers one dials is
not likely to expose deep dark secrets or embarrassing information
to the world. The machine will simply move on, oblivious to any
patterns that are not deemed suspicious. In other words, if you are
not doing anything wrong, you have nothing to hide and nothing to
fear.34

(2009).
28. Richard Willing, Defense Dept. Pays $1B to Outside Analysts, USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 2007,
9:54 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-08-29-dia_N.htm (reporting that the
DOD had contracted with private intelligence professionals, albeit with supervision by government
employees).
29. Daniel J. Solove, ‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 747 (2007).
30. Id. at 749. This rhetorical question serves to show that everyone holds something in private.
31. Id. at 751.
32. Id. at 752-53.
33. One data security expert has suggested that conceiving the dichotomy as privacy pitted
against security mischaracterizes the issue when the tension is actually between liberty and control.
Bruce Schneier, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED NEWS (May 18, 2006, 2:00 AM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20061130065347/http://www.wired.
com/news/columns/1%2C70886-0.html.
34. Solove, supra note 29, at 753.
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In balancing these interests, Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v.
United States is a helpful treatise on privacy. 35 Noting that the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments were designed to protect “the sanctities of a
man’s home and the privacies of life,” 36 Justice Brandeis observed that
‘time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes.’ Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading
privacy have become available to the government. Discovery and
invention have made it possible for the government, by means far
more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in
court of what is whispered in the closet. 37
Expositing the constitutional safeguards provided by the Framers, he
drew attention to the Constitution’s recognition that “only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material
things.”38 Against the government, the Framers installed “the right to be
let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men.”39
Besides Justice Brandeis’s strong endorsement of respecting private
spheres, philosophical and psychological works recognize the effects
surveillance has on people. Michel Foucault developed Jeremy
Bentham’s concept of the Panopticon: a circular, segmented carceral
structure where the observer, occupying a central tower in the midst of a
network of cells, can maintain a constant, alert gaze on every subject
contained within them. 40 Each subject occupies a fixed place and “is
constantly located.”41 This physical manifestation of surveillant power,
however, does not capture today’s nuanced system of surveillance
“assemblages” – the sophisticated network of informational flows

35. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
36. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)).
37. Id. Justice Brandeis goes on to say that “‘in the application of a Constitution, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be.’ The progress of science in
furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping.” Id. at 474.
38. Id. at 478. This passage echoes words Justice Brandeis helped pen almost four decades
earlier in a famous publication with the Harvard Law Review. “The intense intellectual and emotional
life, and the heightening of sensations which came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to men
that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things.” Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
39. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
40. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & P UNISH 195-97 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d
ed. 1995) (1977).
41. Id. Foucault’s Panopticon is largely about the exercise of power: “the slightest movements
are supervised . . . all events are recorded . . . an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and
periphery . . . power is exercised without division . . . .” Id. at 197.
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constantly sourced by diverse outputs such as social media (through
which an individual helps develop her own “surveillance record” 42) and
any other channel through which information is conveyed. 43 In other
words, modern surveillance is bulwarked by the social imperative to
belong to a community, even a digital one. 44 The digitization of
community thus expands surveillance systems into our social
networks.45
The United Kingdom has been criticized for its rapid expansion of
CCTV surveillance, 46 and Americans can look to the United Kingdom to
observe how mass surveillance affects individuals, given the ubiquity of
surveillance systems.47 But we can also refer to our own history. J.
Edgar Hoover’s counter-intelligence program, COINTELPRO was
designed to neutralize certain participants in the political process,
particularly minority voices like those of the Black Panthers and Martin
Luther King, Jr. COINTELPRO offers a vivid glimpse at what
government agencies can accomplish with the knowledge of individuals’
personal information.48 Hoover pried past private barriers the oldfashioned way, but new tools are available today.
2. Drones’ Unique Threat to Privacy
Drones feature advanced technological capabilities such as facial,
license plate, and biometric recognition. 49 Yet drones are also
42. Jennifer Golbeck, All Eyes On You, P SYCHOLOGY TODAY (Sept. 2, 2014),
https://www.psychologytoday.
com/articles/201409/all-eyes-you.
43. Darren Ellis et al., The Affective Atmospheres of Surveillance, 23 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY
716, 717 (2013).
44. See id. at 723.
45. See id. This dynamic does not mean that people knowingly develop their surveillance
records. Selective curation of the selves we decide to present to the world is a salient feature of social
media, but when people with whom we have not decided to share our personal information nevertheless
have access to it, a sense of self and ability to influence the impressions people have on us is in
jeopardy. See Golbeck, supra note 42 (“Most of us try to curate the public identities we broadcast—not
only through the way we dress and speak in public, but also in how we portray ourselves on social
medial platforms.”). See also Jason G. Goldman, How Being Watched Changes You – Without You
Knowing, BBC (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20140209-being-watched-why-thatsgood (“If there is one thing that the rise of social media has taught us it's how to carefully curate the
information we present to the digital world.”).
46. David Murakami Wood & C. William R. Webster, Living in Surveillance Societies: The
Normalisation of Surveillance in Europe and the Threat of Britain’s Bad Example, 5 JOURNAL OF
CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH 259, 259 (2009).
47. Ellis et al., supra note 43, at 716 (noting that cities are particularly concentrated zones of
surveillance).
48. COINTELPRO, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/hueypnewton/actions/actions_cointelpro.html (last
visited Feb. 1, 2017).
49. Future of Drones, supra note 9, at 3.
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controversial “because of their potential use by overreaching
governments.”50 Many commentators express anxiety that current and
imminent applications of drones by the government will deteriorate “our
dwindling individual and collective privacy.”51 A salient feature of
drones is that they are equipped with cameras. 52 They are designed with
remote observation in mind. The operator can see what the drone sees
by feeding the drone’s camera footage either to virtual reality (VR)
goggles or a screen mounted to the remote control. The operator flies the
drone using this visual feedback or by maintaining a visual line of sight
(VLOS) on the craft.53 Drones are autonomous.54 They can “fly, hover,
or navigate without input from a pilot.” 55 Their ability to self-stabilize
without constant control by a pilot is part of what makes them
intelligent.56 Many drones also have multiple rotors, which are a
physical explanation for their autonomy as well. 57 Extra propellers
generate increased lift, enabling them to carry more powerful cameras.58
Those cameras are what pose a threat to privacy interests, 59 and
drones of all sizes have them. 60 Furthermore, manned aircraft impose
practical limitations on the government’s surveillance ability, given the
expense in acquiring, operating, and maintaining them. 61 Drones are
cheaper than manned aircraft.62 “[R]outine aerial surveillance in

50. Georgeanne A. Wallen, Becoming an Orwellian Society: Big Brother is Watching You, 40 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 65, 69 (2015).
51. Calo, supra note 6, at 32.
52. See John Patrick Pulen, This Is How Drones Work, TIME (April 3, 2015),
http://time.com/3769831/this-is-how-drones-work/.
53. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064,
42,066 (proposed June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107).
54. Pulen, supra note 52.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. However, weight also decreases battery life. Consequently, drones are currently
limited to short flight times, usually not much longer than 12 minutes. Id.
59. JAY STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PROTECTING
PRIVACY FROM AERIAL S URVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE
AIRCRAFT 1 (2011) [hereinafter PROTECTING PRIVACY].
60. See id. at 2.
61. Id. at 1.
62. See, e.g., Romesh Ratnesar, Five Reasons Why Drones Are Here to Stay,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (May 23, 2013, 7:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201305-23/five-reasons-why-drones-are-here-to-stay (reporting that military drones represent about one third
of all military aircraft, but manned jets consume over 90 percent of air power spending); Scan Eagle,
U.S. AIR FORCE, https://web.archive.org/web/20130710112005/http://www.af.mil/
information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=10468 (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) (reporting that the Insitu
ScanEagle system, discussed infra, costs $3.2 million for four drones, a catapult, and recovery boom,
providing over 20 hours per flight of “direct situational awareness” with high-resolution day and night
cameras and thermal imager).
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American life” is becoming easier and more reasonable to anticipate,
without new safeguards designed to protect against government abuses
of privacy.63
Drones come in a variety of styles and serve diverse applications. The
armed forces use the large, fixed-wing Predator and Reaper drones in
attacks against Al-Qaeda-linked militants in Pakistan. 64 They can be
operated from remote distances, transmitting video feed of ground
activity to the operators.65 They take off and land like conventional
airplanes and frequently carry missiles and laser-guided bombs.66 In
contrast, fixed-wing drones can be smaller, such as Insitu’s ScanEagle,
which has a 10-foot wingspan and a camera with “full pan, tilt and zoom
capabilities [that] allows the operator to track both stationary and
moving targets.”67 A catapult launcher sends it into flight and a
SkyHook retrieval system—a rope hanging from a 50-foot boom—
captures it in midflight when its mission is complete. 68 After the
Houston police department tested the ScanEagle, inviting law
enforcement personnel to watch the drone’s performance, the FAA was
“flooded” with police requests to fly drones on patrol. 69
The most commercially popular drones may be the easily-acquired
quadcopters that can hover and send video footage to the operator. 70 One
innovator of these drones observed that, as with the personal computer
and Internet before them, the usage and market of drones are unclear.71
63. PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 59, at 1. The ACLU reports, “We need a system of rules
to ensure that we can enjoy the benefits of this technology without bringing us a large step closer to a
‘surveillance society’ in which our every move is monitored, tracked, recorded, and scrutinized by the
authorities.” Id.
64. Id. at 2 (noting that the Predator has a wingspan of 66 feet and can fly as high as 50,000
feet); Steve Coll, The Unblinking Stare: The Drone War in Pakistan, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 24,
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare.
65. Coll, supra note 64.
66. Drones: What Are They and How Do They Work?, BBC (Jan. 31, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-10713898.
67. ScanEagle
Unmanned
Aerial
Vehicle
(Historical
Snapshot),
BOEING,
http://www.boeing.com/history/products/
scaneagle-unmanned-aerial-vehicle.page (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) [hereinafter ScanEagle Snapshot].
68. Id.
69. Stephen Dean, Police Line Up to Use Drones on Patrol After Houston Secret Test, HOUSTON
EXAMINER
(Jan.
11,
2010),
https://web.archive.org/web/20110803064812/http://www.examiner.com/page-one-in-houston/policeline-up-to-use-drones-on-patrol-after-houston-secret-test; PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 59, at 2.
70. See, e.g., Jim Fisher, The Best Drones of 2017, PC MAG (Jan. 23, 2017),
http://www.pcmag.com/roundup/337251/
the-best-drones.
71. Adam Tanner, Drone Innovator Sees Future in Gathering Information, Not Package
Delivery, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2013, 2:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/12/03/droneinnovator-sees-future-in-gathering-information-not-package-delivery/#8bcbbca48518.
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Various applications await to be discovered, but “[s]omething sure will
come.”72 What is clear is that the technology lends itself to being
exploited to gather information. 73
Finally, there are the increasingly tiny drones, such as the Black
Hornet and Nano Hummingbird. 74 The Nano Air Vehicle (“NAV”)
industry illuminates the effort that is going into creating aircraft verging
on undetectable. The Nano Hummingbird, designed by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) within the
Department of Defense (“DOD”), looks like the bird after which it is
named, flapping its wings to stabilize its flight. 75 It exploits a design
process called biomimicry. It can fly through open doors and windows,
sit on power lines, blend in with its environment, and gather information
while camouflaged to look like wildlife. 76 One defense expert reported
that they can be used anywhere, “and the target will never even know
they’re being watched.”77 The Pentagon has contributed about $4
million to the Nano Hummingbird’s development and similar
technology. 78 Another NAV, the Black Hornet, has been described as
“exactly the kind of drone that scares people about drones.” 79 It films in
normal and infrared light, carries regular and thermal cameras, fits in the
palm of a hand, and can be programmed to fly to waypoints
autonomously.80
Some of these drones are designed with military purposes in mind. 81
However, this fact does little to mitigate public concerns about drones
being used domestically for surveillance and criminal investigation. The
DOD has the largest drone force, followed by Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”).82 From 2010 to 2012, CBP flew almost 700
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. W.J. Hennigan, It’s a Bird! It’s a Spy! It’s Both, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/
2011/feb/17/business/la-fi-hummingbird-drone-20110217; Kelsey D. Atherton, Special Forces Test
Hummingbird-Size Drone, POPULAR SCIENCE (May 29, 2015), http://www.popsci.com/americanspecial-forces-test-hummingbird-sized-drone.
75. Theworacle, AeroVironment/DARPA Nano Hummingbird UAV Flying, YOUTUBE (Feb. 17,
2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8ZbtZqH6Io.
76. Hennigan, supra note 74. The developers show an interest in blending into the environment,
pointing out that hummingbirds are rare in New York City and that a sparrow may therefore be better.
Id. This comment is illuminating: the targets of biomimetic reconnaissance live in American cities.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Atherton, supra note 74.
80. Id.; Patrick Tucker, US Special Forces Are Experimenting with Bug Drones, DEFENSE ONE
(May 28, 2015), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/05/us-special-forces-are-experimentingbug-drones/113947/.
81. See Tucker, supra note 80.
82. Craig Whitlock & Craig Timberg, Border-Patrol Drones Being Borrowed by Other Agencies
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surveillance missions with drones on loan to other federal, state, and
local agencies. 83 At the time, CBP was one of the few agencies that the
FAA permitted to use drones daily and domestically. 84 Such interagency
drone-sharing practices – the context of Rodney Brossart’s arrest –
suggest that the purpose a drone is engineered to serve is secondary to
the government’s interest in deploying them to meet ends that may be at
odds with the public’s interest.85
B. Government Response to Drones
1. The Federal Aviation Administration86
In 2012 – the same year Rodney Brossart was arrested – Congress
More
Often
Than
Previously
Known,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Jan.
14,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/border-patrol-drones-being-borrowed-byother-agencies-more-often-than-previously-known/2014/01/14/5f987af0-7d49-11e3-95564a4bf7bcbd84_story.html?utm_term=.f7ad5b3d0fb2.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Michael Peck, Predator Drone Sends North Dakota Man to Jail, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014,
7:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/01/27/predator-drone-sends-north-dakotaman-to-jail/#213036d95853 (reporting on North Dakota farmer, Rodney Brossart, arrested with the
assistance of a Predator drone, most commonly known as what the Air Force uses in the Middle East).
86. The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) falls under the umbrella of the Department of
Transportation (“DOT”), which belongs to the Executive Branch. Given the diverse applications of
drones, including wildfire monitoring, scientific research, border protection, and law enforcement
support, as well as expectations of technological capacity, President Obama ordered Federal agencies to
examine their policies and procedures vis-à-vis the “collection, use, retention, and dissemination of
information obtained by UAS, to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected.”
BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM: PROMOTING ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS WHILE
SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN DOMESTIC USE OF UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (Feb. 15, 2015). The President identified the Privacy Act as an applicable
regulation with which agencies must comply, but did not limit agencies’ compliance to that Act alone.
Id.
Agencies were also instructed to update their policies and procedures, or create new ones, as
such changes become necessary. Id. The collection and use of data acquired by drones must be pursuant
to an authorized purpose. Id. Agencies may only retain drone-acquired personally identifiable
information (“PII”) for 180 days, unless longer retention is necessary to an authorized mission, justified
by the Privacy Act, or required “by any other applicable law or regulation.” Id. Information not
maintained by a recording system provided for by the Privacy Act “shall not be disseminated outside of
the agency unless dissemination is required by law, or fulfills an authorized purpose and complies with
agency requirements.” Id.
The President provided for oversight measures by requiring that agencies verify that federal
personnel and contractors involved in drone programs are guided by rules of conduct and training.
Additionally, agencies must ensure that procedures exist providing for the report of drone abuses and
misuses. Id. Any individuals with access to PII must also operate within a regime of policies and
procedures providing for meaningful oversight. Id. Requests of drone-assistance for governmental
operations must conform to articulable policies and procedures as well. Id. Finally, any government
which receives Federal funding for drones must “have in place policies and procedures to safeguard
individuals’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties prior to expending such funds.” Id.
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passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act (“Reform Act”).87
Among its provisions, the Reform Act authorized and required the FAA
to propose rules governing the use of civil drones in national airspace
(“NAS”). 88 Specifically, Congress instructed the Secretary of
Transportation to “develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace
system.”89 Pursuant to the Reform Act, the FAA finalized the Rules for
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“Part 107”) on June 21, 2016, and
Part 107 went into effect on August 29, 2016.90
Some important observations need to be made. First, Part 107, by
statutory definition, only applies to drones that weigh less than 55
pounds.91 Thus, the executive guidance for which the public has waited,
and about which it commented widely, has not restricted the use of
drones larger than 55 pounds. Second, Part 107 is concerned with
integration of civil unmanned aircraft.92 These two features of the FAA’s
most recent Rules are related in that the drones most civilians fly weigh
less than 55 pounds.93
The second feature – Part 107’s application to civil drones only –
means that government entities are no more regulated after the passage
of the Rules than they were before. “Public aircraft” refers to aircraft
used solely by the United States Government. 94 “Civil aircraft” is any
aircraft that is not a public aircraft.95 Section 332 of the Reform Act
directed the FAA to promulgate a “comprehensive plan” for the
integration of civil drones into the NAS within 270 days of the
enactment of the Act.96 As for public drones, Section 334 directed the
FAA to “issue guidance” regarding their operation, using the same 270day deadline. 97
87.
88.
89.
90.

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (2012).
Id. at § 332(a)(1).
Id.
Press Release – DOT and FAA Finalize Rules for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
FEDERAL
AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION,
(June
21,
2016),
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=20515.
91. § 331(6), 126 Stat. at 72; Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 42,066 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107).
92. See §§ 331-332, 126 Stat. at 72-75. Congress clearly distinguished civil UAS and public
UAS by providing for the former in § 332 and the latter in § 334. Additionally, § 332(a)(2)(H) makes
plain the congressional intent for FAA to provide guidance for the safe and simultaneous operation of
civil and public UAS.
93. See Fisher, supra note 70.
94. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41) (2012). This definition is necessarily simplified and subject to an
exception. If the aircraft is used for commercial purposes, or to carry unqualified non-crewmembers, it
ceases to be a public aircraft, as defined.
95. § 40102(a)(16).
96. § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 73.
97. § 334, 126 Stat. at 76-77. The difference between the development of a “comprehensive
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Part 107 straightforwardly excludes public drones from its
applicability: “this rule applies to civil aircraft operations only.”98 The
FAA had explained in the Notice of Public Rule Making (“NPRM”) that
Part 107 would not apply to public operation of small drones. 99 Public
aircraft operation – the FAA uses the DOD as an example – is already
governed by 14 C.F.R. § 91, but this is not specific to drones. 100 Instead
of broadly applicable regulation, the Certificate of Waiver or
Authorization (“COA”) process controls government use of drones. 101
Responses to the Freedom of Information Act show that a diverse
variety of government entities have requested COAs from the FAA,
namely the Air Force, NASA, CBP, DARPA, police departments from
across the country, and universities. 102
Both NASA and the DOD recommended that the FAA amend the
Rule “to clarify that [P]art 107 does not apply to aircraft operated by or
for the National Defense Forces of the United States, but could be used
as an alternative means of compliance.”103 These comments ultimately
would have been redundant protective measures in the government’s
favor, “because § 107.1 expressly limits the applicability of [P]art 107 to
civil small UAS.”104 Instead, the FAA pointed out that these rules offer
increased flexibility for government drones, because Part 107 permits
the government to comply with its provisions in lieu of seeking a COA
from the FAA. 105
NASA and the DOD were not the only parties that commented on
Part 107 when it was proposed. During the notice and comment period,

plan” for civil drones and issuing “guidance” for public drones is not made clear. However, what is clear
is that the FAA has not proposed separate rules on public drones at anywhere near the same level of
sophistication as it has with civil drones.
98. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064,
42,079 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107).
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also Air Traffic and General Operating Rules, 14 C.F.R. § 91.113. A search of § 91
reveals nothing pertaining to unmanned aircraft, except for unmanned rockets and balloons. See 14
C.F.R. § 91.1.
101. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,079;
see also FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CERTIFICATIONS OF WAIVER OR AUTHORIZATION (COA),
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/Coa/ (last visited Feb. 2,
2017).
102. Fed.
Aviation
Admin.,
Freedom
of
Information
Act
Responses,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/foia_
responses/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) [hereinafter FOIA RESPONSES]. An example of what the COAs
contain include, in the case of the Air Force, a request to fly Predator drones within the jurisdiction of
Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center.
103. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,079.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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the public voiced numerous concerns, many of which related to privacy
from government abuses.106 However, the FAA treated privacy as
beyond the scope of its rulemaking. 107 Part 107 states that the public
comments “demonstrate a lack of consensus” with respect to how
integration of drones jeopardizes the privacy interest, how these
concerns should be addressed, and what role, if any, the FAA has in
addressing privacy. 108 Addressing this purportedly fragmentary record,
the FAA observed that “its mission is to provide the safest, most
efficient aerospace system in the world, and does not include regulating
privacy.”109 The features on drones that provoke concerns about privacy
relate to technology and hardware, not flight safety. 110 The FAA
identified cameras as lying beyond its administrative reach, and for that
matter, the protection of individual privacy. 111 However, the agency did
acknowledge that its detachment from the privacy issue was not the end
of the matter:
[T]here is substantial, ongoing debate among policymakers,
industry, advocacy groups and members of the public regarding the
extent to which UAS operations pose novel privacy issues, whether
those issues are addressed by existing legal frameworks, and the
means by which privacy risks should be further mitigated.
Recognizing the importance of addressing privacy concerns in the
proper forum, the FAA has partnered with other Federal agencies
with the mandate and expertise to identify, develop, and implement
appropriate mitigation strategies to address privacy concerns. 112
The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the FAA’s regulatory
authority over the navigable airspace, with the purpose of ensuring
aircraft safety, efficient use of the airspace, and protection of “persons

106. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, REGULATIONS. GOV,
https://www.regulations.
gov/docket?D=FAA-2015-0150 (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
107. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,190.
“[P]roposed regulations to address privacy concerns were deemed beyond the scope of this rulemaking .
. . Although the FAA regulates the safe and efficient operation of all aircraft within the NAS, the FAA
has never extended its administrative reach to regulate the use of cameras and other sensors extraneous
to the airworthiness or safe operation of the aircraft in order to protect individual privacy” (emphasis
added). Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. “[T]he FAA has never extended its administrative reach to regulate the use of cameras
and other sensors extraneous to the airworthiness or safe operation of the aircraft in order to protect
individual privacy.”
112. Id.
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and property on the ground.” 113 The American Civil Liberties Union has
identified this latter zone of authority—the protection of individuals on
the ground—as obliging the FAA
to protect individuals on the ground [by] protecting the privacy that
Americans have traditionally enjoyed and rightly expect. If the
agency refuses to do so, or is found by the courts to have limited
powers in that area, then Congress should step in to directly enact
any additional protections that are needed to preserve that
privacy.114
However, the Reform Act made it clear that Congress did not intend
for the FAA to make sweeping provisions and restrictions on every
current application of drones. 115 Congress also constrained the content of
the comprehensive plan it directed the FAA to draft by focusing on the
safe operation of drones in the national airspace system. 116 Provisions
related to privacy are absent.117 The FAA reaffirms its congressionally
limited role this way:
None of the UAS-related provisions of Public Law 112–95 [the
Reform Act] directed the FAA to consider privacy issues when
addressing the integration of small UAS into the airspace, or
mandated the inclusion of privacy considerations in the UAS
Comprehensive Plan. Reading such a mandate into Public Law
112–95 would be a significant expansion beyond the FAA’s longstanding statutory authority as a safety agency. 118
2. Congressional Attempts to Regulate Government Drones
Congress has proposed bills drafted to curtail applications of drones
that would intrude on privacy. The Preserving American Privacy Act of
2015, proposed in the House of Representatives in March 2015, seeks
the protection of information that is “reasonably likely to enable
identification of an individual,” and it concerns “an individual’s

113. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 627 (1973).
114. PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 59, at 2.
115. § 332, 126 Stat. 73.
116. See § 332(a)(2)(B), (2)(E), and (2)(H). For instance, (2)(B) reads that the plan “shall contain,
at a minimum, recommendations or projections on . . . the best methods to enhance the technologies and
subsystems necessary to achieve the safe and routine operation of civil unmanned aircraft systems in the
national airspace system . . . .”
117. See § 332, 126 Stat. 73.
118. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,191.
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property that is not in plain view.” 119 The bill requires any government
entity using a drone to submit a data collection statement to the Attorney
General, which provides numerous details, including the purpose of the
mission, the drone’s data-collection capabilities, and the duration for
which the data would be retained. 120 Furthermore, no evidence collected
by the operation of a public drone may be admitted “against an
individual in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding.” 121 The bill further
provides that law enforcement may not use drones to collect or disclose
covered information, except when that action is pursuant to a warrant or
court order, is to monitor the border, is permitted by the prior written
consent of the monitored individual, or is for an emergency such as a
threat to national security. 122 Any covered information collected in
violation of those procedures may not be considered and must be
expunged from the collecting agency’s databases. 123 The Preserving
Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, narrower in
scope, provides for similar restrictions against unwarranted drone
monitoring. 124
The language of the Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act is
perhaps the strongest of all proposed legislation. Proposed in March
2015, the bill observes that drones have traditionally found almost
exclusively military application, but are increasingly being used by
“State and local governments . . . including deployments for law
enforcement operations.”125 Acknowledging the beneficial applications,
“from spotting wildfires to assessing natural disasters,”126 the bill
submits that “there also is the potential for unmanned aircraft system
technology to enable invasive and pervasive surveillance without
adequate privacy protections, and currently, no explicit privacy
protections or public transparency measures with respect to such system
technology are built into the law.” 127 Like the Preserving American
Privacy Act, the Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act would
require a data collection statement minimizing the intake of information
and detailing the purposes, duration, and impact on privacy that the

119. Preserving American Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 1385, 114th Cong. § 3119a(2)(A) (1st Sess.
2015).
120. Id. at § 3119b(c).
121. Id. at § 3119c(a).
122. Id. at § 3119c(b)-(c).
123. Id. at § 3119c(c)(6).
124. Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, H.R. 972, 113th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2013).
125. Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 635, 114th Cong. § 2(2) (1st Sess.
2015).
126. Id. at § 2(5),
127. Id. at § 2(6).
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drone surveillance will have upon the monitored individual. 128
None of these bills have been enacted into law.129 In fact, they have
had to be re-introduced, because their predecessors have died in
previous Congresses.130 One author has argued that federal regulations
on law enforcement’s use of drones could “provid[e] a floor for state
laws.”131 The states would then be the principal legislators of drone law,
citing federal bills that “propose warrant requirements for drone
surveillance by law enforcement.” 132
III. DUE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL PROTECTION AGAINST PUBLIC ACTION
Two lines of Supreme Court cases show when the Court is willing to
extend due process protection: (1) when an individual presents a strong
liberty interest against a weak or weakened government interest and (2)
when the government has acted in a way that shocks the conscience. 133
The first analysis is frequently discharged in the judicial review of
legislation which is allegedly unconstitutional. 134 The second analysis
usually involves executive or police action. 135
When a technological dynamic is significant to a case’s facts, the
Court shows a willingness to defer to Congress as the best-situated body
to protect privacy interests in the face of burgeoning technological
advances. A rule-making body may listen to and reflect changing public
feeling and delineate rules that “balance privacy and public safety in a
comprehensive way.”136
A. The Right to Privacy
In their influential essay, The Right to Privacy, future-Justice Louis
Brandeis and his classmate Samuel Warren chronicled the common
law’s ability to adapt to societal changes and needs. 137 The law’s
128. Id. at § 339(a)-(b).
129. See, e.g., S. 635 (114th): Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s635 (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
130. Id.
131. Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 CAL.
L. REV. CIRCUIT 57, 59 (2013).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
134. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
135. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
136. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
137. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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capacity to expand, without the guidance of precedent or legislation, is
limited; but as the essay’s epigraph suggests, when judicial doctrine
does expand, it is a function of its sensitivity to “principles of private
justice, moral fitness, and public convenience.”138 Significantly, the
impetus of the article was the increasing prevalence of “the
photographic art.”139 In 1888, George Eastman introduced the Kodak
camera, which many amateur photographers used for its simplicity. 140
By 1890, Brandeis and Warren were proposing that tort doctrines could
be expanded to protect people’s right to privacy with respect to
burgeoning photographic technology.141 Describing past judicial
groping, such as prosecuting the reading of private letters as a breach of
contract, they conclude that common law evolutions protecting
“personal appearance, sayings, acts, and . . . personal relations” flow
from the right to privacy, or “rights as against the world.” 142 The
justification for judicially protecting individual privacy depends on the
recognition that
[t]he intense intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening of
sensations which came with the advance of civilization, [make] it
clear to men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life
lay in physical things. Thoughts, emotions, and sensations
demanded legal recognition, and the beautiful capacity for growth
which characterizes the common law enabled the judges to afford
the requisite protection, without the interposition of the
legislature.143
Such doctrinal expansion is a dominant gene in the substantive due
process bloodline. In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas’s
majority opinion relied on the penumbra of the Bill of Rights to protect
the right to privacy for married couples to use contraceptives. 144 The
right, he argued, was protected because of what the Bill of Rights partly

138. Id. at 193 (quoting Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2312).
139. Id. at 211. The authors refer to private action, largely journalistic, which invaded the lives of
others. However, they do not limit to private action their principle of a right to privacy underlying
common law evolutions meant to protect privacy, arguing that “the existing law affords a principle
which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion . . . [by] the possessor of
any other modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds.” Id. at 206.
140. George
Eastman,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/technology/Kodak-camera (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
141. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 137, at 211.
142. Id. at 213. Judge Cooley preferred the right “to be let alone.” Id. at 195.
143. Id. at 195.
144. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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shadows through implication. 145 Justice Harlan’s concurrence disagreed,
arguing that the proper constitutional touchstones were the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and its protection against violations
of values “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”146 Though brief,
the concurrence can be considered to have Justice Harlan’s seminal Poe
v. Ullman dissent appended to it.147
In Poe, Justice Harlan argued that a statute against the use of
contraceptives by married couples was “an intolerable and unjustifiable
invasion of privacy in the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an
individual's personal life.”148 Justice Harlan recognized that legal codes
cannot determine the content of due process; rather, the Court supplies
its content—which is comprised of “history and purposes” rather than of
words—by contemplating the living traditions which guide the Court
into striking a balance between the liberty of the individual and an
organized society’s demands. 149 The continuum of protected liberties
“includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints . . . [recognizing] that certain interests require
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment.”150 Though the Court has not defined “with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed . . . [w]ithout doubt, it denotes, not merely
freedom from bodily restraint . . . .”151 In exegeting what lies within the
boundaries of due process, a “new decision must take ‘its place in
relation to what went before and further (cut) a channel for what is to
come.’”152 Justice Harlan affirmed the characterization in Rochin v.
California of due process as a narrow strip of judicial license enclosed
all around with limits inherent in the judicial process.153 In short, he
does not represent the enterprise of balancing limits with liberty as
anything less than fastidious. Despite these constraints, Justice Harlan
would have found that marital relations were too private for the State’s
moralizing intrusion. 154
If the Poe dissent expressed the limits constraining due process, later
145. Id. at 484 (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”).
146. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
147. Id. (“For reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman . . . I believe that
[the Connecticut statute] does [infringe the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment].)”.
148. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 542-43.
150. Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
151. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
152. Id. at 544 (quoting Irvine v. People of California, 347 U.S. 128, 146 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
153. Id. See Rochin discussion infra.
154. Id. at 555.
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opinions confirmed the license animating due process.155 Roe v. Wade
held that the right of privacy was sufficiently broad to include a
woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy qualified by important state
interests.156 A scrupulous review of prior cases showed that “only
personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty’ are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy.”157 Roe entered a crucible and emerged singed but intact in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.158 Drawing
from the Poe dissent, Justice O’Connor’s opinion observed that
adjudicating substantive due process claims called the Court “to exercise
that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised:
reasoned judgment.”159 Absent, however, is any reference to Palko’s
language that liberty interests are fundamental when they are “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,” 160 which would later be adopted by
the Washington v. Glucksberg majority in structuring substantive due
process analysis going forward.161 Instead, Justice O’Connor employed
a stare decisis analysis that identified two decisional lines that had
ended with watershed cases, demonstrating appropriate justifications for
departing from stare decisis.162 The Court thus found each case
comprehensible as the Court's response to facts that the country
could understand, or had come to understand already, but which
the Court of an earlier day, as its own declarations disclosed, had
not been able to perceive. As the decisions were thus
comprehensible they were also defensible, not merely as the
victories of one doctrinal school over another by dint of numbers
(victories though they were), but as applications of constitutional
principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before. In
constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed
circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part
of the Nation could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as

155. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 763 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting
“Justice Harlan's respect for the tradition of substantive due process review itself, and his
acknowledgment of the Judiciary's obligation to carry it on.”).
156. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
157. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citation omitted).
158. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
159. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
160. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
161. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
162. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-64 . The cases were West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of District of Columbia and signaling an end to
Lochner v. New York) and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (repudiating Plessy v.
Ferguson’s separate-but-equal rule).
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a response to the Court's constitutional duty. 163
In this light, Roe had to be upheld. 164 Society’s understanding of what
Roe meant had not so changed that justified overruling it. 165
Washington v. Glucksberg demonstrates the difficulty that substantive
due process claims face.166 It is in Glucksberg that the Court synthesizes
a major analytical standard by which to measure substantive due process
claims. Substantive due process protects fundamental rights and liberties
that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” 167 and
“‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they are sacrificed.’”168 Secondly, the
fundamental liberty interest must be carefully described. 169 The
government may in no way infringe such an interest, but narrowly
tailored infringements designed to advance a compelling government
interest will be evaluated with strict scrutiny. 170 The Court narrowly
construed Casey’s existential and philosophical flourishes about
defining one’s own ontological concepts as actually referring to
“personal activities and decisions” that comport with the newly
expressed (and narrow) standard.171 In addition to Casey, an observation
further narrows the new standard: although personal autonomy is a
common thread in many liberties protected by due process, this “does
not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important,
intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, and Casey did not
suggest otherwise.”172 Measured against this standard, the Washington
statute prohibiting physician-assisted suicide did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. 173
Justice Rehnquist criticized Justice Souter’s suggested framework,
163. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64.
164. Id. at 901. “Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to
us and then to future generations . . . We accept our responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full
meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents.”
165. Id. at 864. “Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe 's central holding nor our
understanding of it has changed (and because no other indication of weakened precedent has been
shown), the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the prior law with any justification beyond a
present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Court of 1973.”
166. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
167. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
168. Glucksberg, 521 U.S at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 727 (“By choosing this language, the Court's opinion in Casey described, in a general
way and in light of our prior cases, those personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified
as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally
ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
172. Id. at 727-28 (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 735.
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influenced by the Poe dissent, as forfeiting this “restrained
methodology” and defenseless against the subjectivity attendant to
substantive due process claims. 174 Justice Souter, who joined Justice
O’Connor’s Casey opinion, proposed a different substantive due process
framework, which arguably has a germ in the emphasis in Rochin and
Casey on the inevitability of using reasoned judgment to evaluate due
process claims. 175 Justice Souter would first require that the values the
Court recognized be “truly deserving of constitutional stature.”176 This
constraint echoes the Poe dissent’s warning against permitting one’s
personal convictions to transgress the principles inherent in the judicial
tradition.177 Passing this threshold, a due process claim is next weighed
against the state’s interest; the Court balances the relative “dignities of
the contending interests, and to this extent the judicial method is familiar
to the common law.”178 When the “legislation's justifying principle,
critically valued, is so far from being commensurate with the individual
interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied . . . the statute must
give way.”179
Lawrence v. Texas adopted Justice Souter’s due process analysis in
overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld a state law criminalizing
sodomy, thus extending the right for homosexual relations between
consenting adults.180 Though not explicit in its application, the majority
opinion modeled Justice Souter’s guidance to first determine that the
claimed right rose to a constitutional stature. 181 From there, Justice
Kennedy engaged in common law methodology as Justice Souter
prescribed in Glucksberg, and similar to Justice O’Connor’s approach in
Casey. Casey and Romer v. Evans had substantially eroded the shore on

174. Id. at 721-22.
175. Id. at 767-68 (Souter, J., concurring). See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (“The inescapable fact is that adjudication of
substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that
same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.”); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952) (“To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could be
avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time or thought is to suggest that the
most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate machines and not for
judges.”).
176. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767 (Souter, J., concurring).
177. Id. (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 542).
178. Id. at 767.
179. Id. at 768.
180. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
181. Id. at 567 (“To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it
to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse . . . . The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”).
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which Bowers had been built. 182 Against this weakened precedent, the
individual interest was great. The stigma of a criminal conviction
jeopardizes the charged person’s dignity; 183 one’s existence is derogated
and destiny controlled when a state criminalizes private sexual
conduct.184 Application of this framework, very different from
Glucksberg, resulted in the overruling of Bowers.
Thus, Lawrence is a sort of inverse of Casey, though the Court
applied similar reasoning in both cases: after extensive consideration of
the propriety and constitutionality of the right under review, the Court
overturned one case depriving liberties in the former and upheld another
case protecting liberties in the latter. Their similar methodologies both
resulted in the protection of individual liberties when balanced against
opposing government interests.
Glucksberg’s continuing applicability is in question after Obergefell
v. Hodges.185 Obergefell stated that Glucksberg’s insistence on careful
description of the right claimed, “with central reference to specific
historical practices,” was inconsistent with any inquiry concerning
fundamental rights.186 Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent sharply criticized
the majority for “jettison[ing]” Glucksberg.187
B. Due Process Protection Against Executive Action
Rochin v. California provides the foundation for evaluating due
process protections of human dignity and constitutionally intolerable
methods of police evidence-gathering. 188 The story of Rochin begins
with a man sitting on his bed with his wife when police entered the
bedroom and demanded to know who owned the pills on the nightstand.
Rochin grabbed the pills and swallowed them. 189 The police wrestled
him, but were unable to extract the pills. They handcuffed him and took
him to a hospital, where they ordered a doctor to force an emetic
through a tube into Rochin’s stomach, against his will. He vomited. The
vomit contained two pills, which held morphine. 190 These pills were
used as evidence against him at trial, where he was convicted. 191
182. Id. at 576.
183. Id. at 575.
184. Id. at 578.
185. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
186. Id. at 2602.
187. Id. at 2620-21 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“the majority’s position requires it to effectively
overrule Glucksberg”).
188. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
189. Id. at 166.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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Although the conviction was affirmed on appeal, one judge found that
the record revealed “a shocking series of violations of constitutional
rights.”192
In an opinion written by Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the methods used to obtain the conviction violated
due process. 193 Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that the administration
of criminal justice was largely entrusted to the States 194 and a court’s
application of due process ought not be wielded as a “destructive
dogma” against States’ administration of criminal justice. 195 However,
though not specified in any authoritative formulation, due process
guarantees “respect for those personal immunities . . . ‘so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental’196 or are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” 197
Regard for these requirements “inescapably imposes on this Court an
exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings.”198
Addressing the inexact contours of due process, the Court observed
that “[i]n dealing not with the machinery of government but with human
rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning, is
not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of constitutional
provisions.”199 The nature of this sort of judgment precluded “freezing
‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time,” because the
adjudication of constitutional rights was a task for judges and not
“inanimate machines.”200 On the contrary, these were not episodic, ad
hoc judgments, but judgments that required care in reconciling the
“needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive society.”201 In a
word, this judicial task required humility. 202
From this posture of judicial humility, the Court found that the
government’s investigative conduct was “too close to the rack and the
screw.”203 Invading the man’s privacy, struggling to open his mouth, and
forcibly extracting the contents of his stomach shocked the
192. Id. at 167.
193. Id. at 174.
194. Id. at 168.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 169 (quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
197. Id. (quoting Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (citations omitted).
198. Id. (quoting Malinksi v. People of State of New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)). The
object of review in the Malinksi line of cases is a state court conviction.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 171.
201. Id. at 172.
202. Justice Frankfurter treats, at some length, the expansion of due process rights as demanding
“the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that one's own views are incontestable and
alert tolerance toward views not shared.” Id. at 171.
203. Id. at 172.
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conscience. 204 The Court considered it well established that due process
made requirements upon the investigative means used to produce
legitimate evidence. Notably, the Court was reluctant to lay down a
clear standard with which law enforcement must comply in obtaining
convictions, other than those methods must not offend “a sense of
justice.”205 However, figuring prominently in the Court’s reasoning were
analogies between coerced confessions and the brutality showed by the
police. “A sense of justice” was shocked when law enforcement coerced
a confession, and so with brutal displays of power. 206
The Court narrowed its holding further, noting that its resolution of
this matter did not impact State court cases dealing with “essentially
different, even if related” matters that had arisen “through use of modern
methods and devices for discovering wrongdoers . . . .”207 Clearly, the
facts in Rochin were of principle importance and the distinguishing
factors were the brutalizing force and offense to human dignity.
“[H]ypothetical situations can be conjured up,” the opinion states, and
incrementalism does not always flow along a logical path, but “the
Constitution ‘is intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not
to maintain theories.’”208
Justice Black concurred, but criticized the majority for relying on
“evanescent standards” and the “accordion-like qualities of this
philosophy [which] must inevitably imperil all the individual liberty
safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.”209
It is easy to see that the methods the police used to gather evidence
invaded Rochin’s body to a conscience-shocking degree. 210 An example
of what is not shocking to the conscience is a city’s failure to train its
employees. That was the issue in Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
which concluded that any breach by the city in securing a safe working
environment is actionable under state tort law, not due process. 211 Nor is

204. Id.
205. Id. at 173 (“Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining,
and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be
brought about by methods that offend ‘a sense of justice.’”).
206. Id. “So here, to sanction the brutal conduct . . . would be to afford brutality the cloak of law.”
Id. It has been elsewhere acknowledged that the due process protection on display in Rochin is provoked
by an abuse of the defendant's person. See State v. Delisio, 2d Dist. Greene No. 91-CA-46, 1992 WL
213451, at *7 (Sept. 3, 1992).
207. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174.
208. Id. (quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904)).
209. Id. at 177 (Black, J., concurring). Both Justice Black’s and Justice Douglas’s separate
concurrences reasoned that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination prohibited the
police from admitting evidence obtained by forcing the defendant to vomit.
210. See id. at 174.
211. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

25

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 11

382

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

such neglect “arbitrary in a constitutional sense.” 212
Paul v. Davis held that police chiefs were not liable under Section
1983 for circulating a shoplifter’s photograph to area merchants. 213 The
claimed constitutional protection was too different to more substantive
privacy decisions “relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, and child rearing and education.”214 A sharp dissent
criticized the majority for permitting law enforcers to “condemn
innocent individuals as criminals and thereby brand them with one of
the most stigmatizing and debilitating labels in our society.” 215 Justice
Brennan argued that the Court had gone against its own procedural due
process precedent “recognized that the public branding of an individual
implicates interests cognizable as either ‘liberty’ or ‘property,’ and held
that such public condemnation cannot be accomplished without
procedural safeguards designed to eliminate arbitrary or capricious
executive action.”216
Whalen v. Roe recognized a privacy interest in “avoiding disclosure
on personal matters,” but did not find that this interest was violated by a
statute providing for the recording of Schedule II drug prescriptions and
the patients who received them. 217 The statute was not arbitrary, because
it confronted a problem as “an orderly and rational legislative
decision.”218
Finally, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, Justice Souter reiterated
that the Court’s “touchstone of due process is protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government,”219 and clearly
separated the arbitrariness analysis “whether it is legislation or a specific
act of a governmental officer that is at issue.”220 Only truly egregious
actions by a government official rise to the level of constitutional
arbitrariness that was lacking in Collins.221 And here, Justice Souter
pointed to Rochin as a continuing standard of this level of arbitrariness
that permits the Court to step between a claimant and a wayward
212. Id. at 130.
213. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 725 (citing Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969)).
217. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). See also Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d
631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff had stated a claim against police for circulating “highly
sensitive, personal, and private” photographs of him, reasoning that lower court misapplied Paul by not
considering Whalen’s recognition that a constitutional right to privacy inheres in “avoiding disclosure of
personal matters”).
218. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597.
219. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
220. Id. at 846.
221. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/11

26

White: Clipped Wings: Domestic Drone Surveillance and the Limits of Due

2018]

DRONE SURVEILLANCE AND DUE PROCESS

383

government official: “for half a century now we have spoken of the
cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the
conscience . . . In the intervening years we have repeatedly adhered to
Rochin’s benchmark.”222 The Rochin line of cases thus serve as a
weathervane in evaluating what sort of situations the Supreme Court is
willing to employ the Due Process Clause as a bar to intrusive
investigations by law enforcement. 223
IV. OBSTACLES TO JUDICIAL PROSCRIPTION OF GOVERNMENT DRONE
SURVEILLANCE
A. Test Cases
As seen above, whatever drone model is employed – the hulking
Predator, the agile ScanEagle, the furtive Black Hornet, or the
ubiquitous quadcopter – an onboard camera enables the operator to
observe private behavior. Surveillance by drones differs from
surveillance through other media. The public anxiety toward overhead
observation by physical and mechanical eyes has been on display in
Compton, Dayton, Baltimore and rural North Dakota. A company based
in Dayton, Ohio – Persistent Surveillance Systems (“PSS”) – developed
a means of surveilling an entire city by installing a 192-megapixel aerial
camera array to the bottom of an aircraft.224 Once aloft, the array takes
one picture every second of the city below.225 Computers stabilize and
patch the photographs together to capture a region as large as 25 square
miles.226 Originally developed for the Pentagon for use in Afghanistan,
CEO Ross McNutt made it possible to use these wide-area pictures to
create a live-feed that recorded not just the outlay of an entire city,
including cars and individuals, but also capture the passage of time. 227
He likens the surveillance system to a “‘live version of Google Earth’
complete with a rewind button.”228
The poor resolution prevents the identification of individuals and

222. Id. at 846-47.
223. See also York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 456 (9th Cir. 1963) (plaintiff stated a § 1983 and due
process claim when police arbitrarily intruded upon her privacy by taking unnecessary nude
photographs of her).
224. Chris Stewart, Wide Net, Big Problems Cast By New Police Tools, D AYTON DAILY NEWS
(March 28, 2015, 7:27 p.m.), http://www.mydaytondailynews.com/news/news/local-govt-politics/widenet-big-problems/nkgjp/.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Reel, supra note 11.
228. Stewart, supra note 224.
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vehicle models.229 Instead, the photographs render individuals as pixels
that an analyst can track by moving backwards or forwards in time
through the series of photographs. 230 When a roadside bomb would
explode, analysts could isolate the location of the explosion, zoom in to
where it was detonated, and scroll through the pictures backwards in
time to the moment of the explosion – and then keep rewinding until
they saw a pixel, representing a person or vehicle stopping at that
location long enough to plant the bomb. 231 From there, they could follow
the suspects backwards and forwards in time, learning where they went
next, where they lived, or where their network was based. 232 Thus,
instead of single individuals, McNutt’s technology identified whole
networks of enemies.233
The technology found a domestic market. In 2012, the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department employed PSS for a nine-day trial period
over Compton. 234 The police did not tell the city’s residents or the
mayor.235 The aircraft, heavy with its camera array, flew in a continuous
loop over Compton, transmitting images to the sheriff’s office. 236 The
surveillance was intentionally kept a secret. One police sergeant
explained, “A lot of people do have a problem with the eye in the sky,
the Big Brother . . . so in order to mitigate any of those kinds of
complaints, we basically kept it pretty hush-hush.”237 When the people
of Compton learned about the surveillance a year later, they angrily
protested and demanded new policies that protected their privacy. 238
When PSS sought an opportunity to flex its muscles at its home base
in Dayton, Ohio, the police were interested, but first held public
hearings to gauge the community’s sentiment. 239 The proposal was met
with much opposition, particularly from the African-American
community.240 The city leaders decided against hiring PSS.241
The Baltimore Police Department did not inform the public when it

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Reel, supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Angel Jennings, et al., Sheriff’s secret air surveillance of Compton sparks outrage, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (April 23, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sheriffssurveillance-compton-outrage-20140423-story.html.
237. Id.
238. Reel, supra note 11.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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began using the technology.242 In February 2016, the shooting of two
elderly siblings gave PSS the opportunity to find the suspect. The
analysts examined the aerial photographs of the scene. They spent two
hours tracking vehicles leaving the scene, until they learned that the
suspect had fled on foot. The analysts returned to the moment of the
shooting and observed a person appear to rush away after the shots were
fired.243 Though the person only appeared as a pixelated dot, they
tracked his movements forward in time until he entered a house. Later, a
vehicle arrived at the house. Someone exited the house, entered the car,
and traveled to a hospital. They tracked him as far as the emergency
room entrance. But due to the earlier confusion, they were not tracking
the person in real time. It seemed they had no way to find the person
after he entered the hospital.244
Then the police determined that the house the man entered was
probably owned by the girlfriend of Carl Anthony Cooper, who had a
criminal record. Additionally, in tracking the person’s movements, the
analysts realized he had passed in front of a ground-level security
camera, whose footage they retrieved. Comparison between the security
footage and the Cooper’s mug shot yielded a “possible match.” 245 The
police later labeled Cooper as “Public Enemy #1,” posting his picture
and the footage from the security camera, which did not reveal
suspicious behavior.246 The public was confused at how the police had
concluded Cooper was the man who had shot the elderly siblings.
Eventually Cooper was arrested for attempted murder and assault. The
police said nothing of the surveillance technology which gave them a
basis for his arrest.247
The ACLU has suggested that it is a matter of time before the limits
of the current aircraft carrying the camera array will give way to
drones,248 which are far less limited in practicality. There are functional
and financial rationales for this. The ScanEagle, popular with law
enforcement, can stay aloft for 20 hours at a time, 249 whereas McNutt’s
pilots can stay aloft for only six hours. 250 Financially, the City of Dayton

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. McNutt himself believes the surveillance technology is best used transparently. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jay Stanley, Baltimore Police Secretly Running Aerial Mass-Surveillance in the Sky,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 24, 2016, 11:30 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/freefuture/baltimore-police-secretly-running-aerial-mass-surveillance-eye-sky.
249. ScanEagle Snapshot, supra note 67.
250. PBS NEWSHOUR, (Apr. 26, 2014, 12:56 PM) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/new-policesurveillance-techniques-raise-privacy-concerns/.
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(in addition to the residents’ privacy concerns) was reluctant to pay
$120,000 “for such a short time in the air.”251 Purchase of an entire
surveillance system starts at $1.5 million, or a city could pay $2,000 per
hour.252 Local agencies may invest in their own drone surveillance
systems or continue borrowing them from agencies with their own drone
force. After all, interagency drone-sharing is already significantly
occurring with Customs and Border Patrol through the Certificate of
Authority process. 253
It was through an interagency drone loan that the Nelson County
Sheriff’s Department in North Dakota arrested Rodney Brossart and his
sons.254 In the dispute over his neighbor’s cows, Brossart grew
increasingly angry and threatened to kill the police officers who came to
intervene. 255 A 16-hour standoff followed on the massive 3,000 acre
property.256 The police called a nearby Air Force base and, very shortly
thereafter, a Predator drone was airborne. The Predator tracked down
Brossart’s exact location.257
In the ensuing prosecution, the state argued that the drone was not in
use when Brossart threatened to kill the police officers, and it was only
deployed as a “last ditch effort to peacefully end the nearly daylong
deadlock.”258 Brossart argued that the “guerilla-like police tactics” and
lack of judicial warrant made the use of the drone illegal. 259 In 2012,
U.S. District Court Judge Joel Medd disagreed, concluding that “‘there
was no improper use of an unmanned aerial vehicle’ and that the drone
‘appears to have had no bearing on these charges being contested
here.’”260 Two years later, a jury found Brossart guilty of terrorizing the
police. 261
B. Litigating Due Process Claims Against Weighty State Interests
Since Part 107 does not apply to government drones and meaningful
251.
252.
253.
254.

Stewart, supra note 224.
Id.
See Whitlock & Timberg, supra note 82.
Steve Lee, Lakota, N.D., Farmer Sentenced to 6 Months in Terrorizing Case, GRAND FORKS
HERALD (Jan. 14, 2014, 1:13 PM), http://www.grandforksherald.com/content/lakota-nd-farmersentenced-6-months-terrorizing-case.
255. State v. Brossart, 858 N.W.2d 275, 282 (N.D. 2015).
256. Wolverton, supra note 1.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Jason Koebler, North Dakota Man Sentenced to Jail in Controversial Drone-Arrest Case,
U.S. NEWS (Jan. 15, 2014, 11:55 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/01/15/north-dakotaman-sentenced-to-jail-in-controversial-drone-arrest-case.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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congressional statutes have not been passed, citizens may have to resort
to the courts. The Certificate of Authority system likely increases the
discretion the FAA has in permitting governmental agencies to use
drones. The Freedom of Information of Act requests made public are
categorized per the requesting body. Some files are enormous,
containing many applications by agencies to use drones. 262
Whether the due process attack comes under a claimed right to
privacy or an allegation of arbitrariness against a government official,
difficulties will meet the claimant immediately. The state interests are
significant. Preventing crime and protecting national security are
inherent powers held by the government. The Supreme Court has
protected this governmental power in its due process jurisprudence by
proscribing primarily the most offensive government conduct. Taking a
man to a hospital and forcing him to vomit offends a sense of justice and
shocks any sense of decency.263 So does forcing a woman to submit to
nude photographs while in police custody. 264 Such conduct is
appropriately proscribed. But even as it is proscribed, significant police
latitude is preserved. If the action does not rise to the level that shocks
the conscience or is “fatally arbitrary,”265 there is no violation of a
person’s constitutional right to due process. So, circulating photographs
of a shoplifter to area merchants 266 and deliberate indifference to a
suspect’s life in a police chase267 are not automatically arbitrary or
conscience-shocking.
County of Sacramento re-emphasized the principle that due process
protects an individual from the government’s arbitrary exercise of
power.268 In stark contrast to the fact scenarios in the Court’s shock-theconscience and arbitrary executive action jurisprudence, Brossart’s
arrest falls far below this standard. He threatened to kill police who had
been called to his property because he had refused to return cows that
obviously belonged to his neighbor. Not only did Brossart threaten the
police, but his three sons did as well.269 The police force in that case had
to contend with four armed men on a 3,000-acre property with which the
four men were very familiar. No matter the state of technology, Brossart
did not have the right to evade the police on his land. Having given the
police cause to pursue him, he surrendered the right to privacy on his
262. FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 102.
263. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
264. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 456 (9th Cir. 1963) (plaintiff stated a § 1983 and due process
claim when police arbitrarily intruded upon her privacy by taking unnecessary nude photographs of her).
265. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
266. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
267. County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 855.
268. Id.
269. Lee, supra note 254.
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own property. Before drone technology, the police would have been able
to come onto his property to arrest him. Drones make it easier for the
government to enforce the rule of law, but an increase in law
enforcement efficiency per se does not violate fundamental rights. The
government is permitted to adopt new forms of technology in the
fulfillment of its mission.
Similarly, deployment of the PSS technology from a drone would not
rise to the level of arbitrary government action. First, the photographs
render individuals as anonymous pixels, impossible to identify as
specific individuals. Although Cooper was roughly identified after he
entered a certain house in Baltimore, his identity was established
through other means, including uncontroversial street-level cameras.
Second, society is generally comfortable with the exchange of a minimal
amount of privacy for increased community protection. For instance, the
PSS technicians were only tracking Cooper’s pixel because he had fled
the crime scene after the shots were fired. The intersection of a violent
crime and suspicious behavior was the impetus for tracking him.
Fundamentally, this is nothing new to criminal justice.
Even in situations less antagonistic than what Brossart provoked or
what Cooper was involved in, Paul v. Davis makes it very difficult for
any claim of right to prevail when there is a suspicion of criminal
activity. However, Paul v. Davis needs to harmonize with the Court’s
later rulings in Lawrence and Obergefell. This latter line of cases is
arguably not out of reach from a claim like Brossart’s, or the people of
Baltimore complaining of clandestine police surveillance. In Seegmiller
v. LaVerkin City,270 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged County of
Sacramento’s division of substantive due process analyses based on
whether the challenged action is legislative or executive. 271 Fatally
arbitrary legislation differs from a fatally arbitrary specific act by a
government official. However,
[n]owhere in that opinion or elsewhere, however, did the Court
establish an inflexible dichotomy. This makes good sense, for the
distinction between legislative and executive action is ancillary to
the real issue in substantive due process cases: whether the plaintiff
suffered from governmental action that either (1) infringes upon a
fundamental right, or (2) shocks the conscience. 272
If the difference is merely ancillary, government use of drones that
infringes upon a fundamental right may trigger an analysis closer to
270. Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762 (2008).
271. Id. at 767-68.
272. Id. at 768.
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Obergefell than Glucksberg. The Obergefell opinion is nothing if not it
does hinge on a fundamental right. Chief Justice Roberts’ prophesy that
Glucksberg has been ejected may come to bear.
Access to the fundamental right analysis, however, does not
necessarily carry a claim against government use of drones very far. The
right still must pass constitutional muster under Lawrence. The
individual liberty interest against unnecessary observation is deserving
of constitutional stature. But Lawrence’s balancing of interests ends
unfavorably for a claimant seeking complete liberty from government
surveillance, by drones or any other technology. We consent to our
appearances being captured by security cameras and law enforcement
every time we venture out of our homes. Road signs already notify us
that our speed is monitored by aircraft. In the virtual realm, many treat
the internet as a public space and expect little or no privacy with respect
to their digital selves, 273 an attitude which comports with reality. The
transaction is a slight degree of privacy for potentially substantial
increases in security and police efficiency.
V. CONCLUSION
Without overt government intrusion in a person’s most private space,
it is not likely that a court will grant broad due process protections to an
individual complaining of the government’s use of drones, which is
based in interests as weighty as national security and criminal control.
American society is already under significant surveillance. As
technology advances, state and federal congresses should embrace their
legislative role in tailoring policies that protect individuals from
overreaching government uses of drones. First, the Supreme Court has
shown a willingness to uphold legislation providing for appropriate uses
of and safeguards against the sort of technology whose abuse may result
in substantial encroachments by the government into private life. 274
Second, there is a dearth of precedent supporting a due process right of
privacy in protecting the populace from surveillance. Third, the federal
Congress, and especially state legislatures, are keenly postured to tailor
rules that clearly demarcate socially beneficial and appropriate
government uses of drones from the undesirable applications that
intrude into realms that ought to remain private.

273. Janis L. Goldie, Virtual Communities and the Social Dimension of Privacy, 3 U. OTTAWA L.
TECH. J. 133, 153 (2006).
274. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“In circumstances
involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”). In
fact, Senator Grassley has recognized that Jones is “a good starting point for a discussion on drones.”
Future of Drones, supra note 9, at 4.
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